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and the sovereign debt crises of  2010, as a fundamental complement to Economic and Monetary 
Union, since it is one of  the blocks that allows its deepening, harmonising the supervision, resolution 
and protection of  depositors in the Euro Zone. However, the third pillar, the European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme, has not yet been implemented, contributing to the non-completion and inefficiency 
of  this European project in the face of  a new financial crisis.This text seeks to contribute to a better 
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1. Background 
The creation of  the European System of  Financial Supervision had as its main 
mission to resolve the economic and financial crisis of  2007-2008. However, an 
integrated European supervisory system has been proved as insufficient and limited to 
address many of  the problems tormenting the European financial market, since it only 
focused on financial supervision, completely ignoring the possibility that supervision 
may not be effective and the fact that the guarantee mechanisms to be activated in 
the institutions’ insolvency situations (deposit guarantee systems and recapitalization 
mechanisms) remain at national level. In addition to the limitations of  the European 
System of  Financial Supervision, there is a lack of  a single rulebook for all Member 
States of  the European Union which, together with the lack of  common intervention 
mechanisms, made it impossible to garner a coordinated response from all Member 
States to the financial crisis.
The European debt crisis comprises the sovereign debt crises of  the various 
Member States and the European banking crisis, which have resulted in a crisis of  
consumer confidence as well as the integrity of  the Euro area.1 Of  these two types 
of  crises, the sovereign debt crises were the ones that most disturbed the stability of  
the European financial system, which were motivated by the lack of  European rescue 
mechanisms, with the States being responsible for rescuing failed credit institutions 
located in their territory (bail-out operations). Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Greece are 
examples of  EU Member States with large public debts after bailing out failed national 
credit institutions, eventually transferring that debt to their taxpayers.2 These States, 
in debt, were forced to request financial assistance (from the so-called Troika). It was 
essential to break the vicious circle between bank debt and sovereign debt.
There was an urgent need to find a suitable solution to eliminate interdependence 
between banks and States, provided that this solution appeared on the European scene 
with the deepening of  the Economic and Monetary Union.3
In view of  the risk of  disintegration of  the Euro area and the present financial 
fragmentation, a report, prepared jointly with the Presidents of  the European Council 
(Herman Van Rompuy) the European Commission (Durão Barroso), the European 
Central Bank (Mario Draghi) and the Eurogroup (Jean Claude Junker), entitled 
“Towards a genuine monetary economic union” (also known as the “Report of  the Four 
Presidents”)4, was presented in the European Council of  December 2012. This report 
determines the building of  a European structure to solidify the single currency and the 
Euro zone and presents four “building blocks” which are totally interdependent: an 
integrated financial framework (“Banking Union”); an integrated budgetary framework 
(“Budgetary Union”); an integrated economic policy framework to ensure economic 
growth, increased competitiveness and employment (“Economic Union”); and the 
strengthening of  the democratic legitimacy and accountability of  the EU’s decision-
1 See Carlos Filipe Fernandes de Andrade Costa, O mecanismo único de supervisão no quadro da União 
Bancária Europeia: contributo para o direito administrativo bancário (Lisbon: AAFDL Editora, 2018), 29.
2 See A. Mendonça Pinto, “A União Bancária Europeia: a necessidade e a dificuldade”, Revista 
Inforbanca, No. 95 (January-March, 2013): 5-6, http://ifb.pt/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/IFB-
InforBanca_095.pdf.
3 See Carlos Costa, “Processo de construção da União Bancária: balanço e perspetivas”, Revista Inforbanca, 
No. 100 (April-June 2014): 5, http://ifb.pt/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/IFB-InforBanca_100.pdf.
4 See Herman Van Rompuy et al., “Rumo a uma verdadeira união económica e monetária” (Bruxelas: 
Conselho Europeu, 2012), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/23819/134203.pdf.
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making bodies to the European Parliament and national parliaments (“Political 
Union”).The strong interdependence between the Banking union, the Budgetary union 
and the Political union indicates the impossibility of  concluding a European Banking 
Union without progress in the other two building blocks. A genuine European Banking 
Union requires an autonomous European resolution authority and a European Federal 
deposit guarantee scheme, which undoubtedly requires a support from a budgetary 
authority at European level to acquire credibility and reputation. The Budgetary union 
that could constitute the support mechanism, in turn, is difficult to foresee without 
a Political union that, at least in part, corrects the “structural democratic deficit” of  
the EU institutions.5 As we can see, the European Banking Union is part of  a vast 
reform package that must address sovereign fragility and the connection of  banks with 
sovereigns.6
The previous Report, together with the communication from the European 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council entitled “Roadmap for 
Banking Union”7, like other reports, was decisive on the creation and establishment 
of  a fruitful Banking Union in terms of  deepening a “true Economic and Monetary 
Union”. A more centralized system of  financial supervision and resolution was, for 
these reports, considered necessary, as a result of  the context and events described, to 
reestablish the credibility and stability of  the European banking system and to break 
the aforementioned link between banks and States, contributing, in this way, to solve 
the nuclear problems of  the Euro area.8
The main task of  a genuine European Banking Union was to break the close 
link between bank debt and sovereign debt, as well as to mitigate the gradual risk of  
fragmentation of  banking markets, since it affects the Internal Market for financial 
services and disrupts the transmission of  monetary policy to the real economy.9 As 
Cristina Casalinho explains, with a true European Banking Union, the connection 
between banks and States might not be completely extinct, but at least it would be 
partially extinct, as credit institutions with the European Banking Union would be 
more robust and more resilient to disruptions arising from systemic crises and credit 
institutions in situations of  insolvency would be resolved without any interference by 
taxpayers in their bailouts, leaving States free from bail-outs and in a more favorable 
fiscal position.10
5 See Nicolas Véron, “Europe’s Single Supervisory Mechanism and Long Journey Towards Banking 
Union”, Bruegel Policy Contribution, No. 16 (outubro de 2012): 3-4, https://bruegel.org/wp-content/
uploads/imported/publications/pc_2012_03.pdf.
6 See Thorsten Beck, “Banking union for Europe – risks and challenges”, in Banking Union for Europe 
– risks and challenges, ed. Thorsten Beck (London: CEPR, 2012), 11, https://voxeu.org/sites/default/
files/file/Banking_Union.pdf.
7 See Communication from the Comission to the European Parliament and the Council, A Roadmap 
towards a Banking Union, COM (2012) 0510 final, accessed October 17, 2018, available at https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/pt/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52012DC0510.
8 See Rui do Carmo, “The Single Supervisory Mechanism in the context of  a European Banking 
Union under construction: bridging the Euro debt crisis with defences designed for the future”, 
UNIO EU Law Journal, vol. 4, No. 1 (2018): 72-73, https://revistas.uminho.pt/index.php/unio/
article/view/62/42.
9 See Paula Vaz Freire, Mercado Interno e União Económica e Monetária: lições de direito económico da União 
Europeia (Lisboa: AAFDL, 2013), 291 apud André Mendes Barata, “O mecanismo único de resolução: 
análise à luz do caso BES”, Revista da Ordem dos Advogados, 77 (2017): 119, https://portal.oa.pt/
media/125350/roa-i_ii-2017.pdf.
10 See Cristina Casalinho, “União Bancária: Avanços recentes e futuros desenvolvimentos”, Revista 
Inforbanca, No. 108 (September-December 2016): 4-5, https://ifb.pt/editorial/inforbanca-108/.
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The European Banking Union, whose members are all Euro zone countries and all 
non-Eurozone countries that decide to participate in the European Banking Union, is 
based on three chronologically interconnected pillars, namely the: a) Single Supervisory 
Mechanism; b) the Single Resolution Mechanism and; c) the European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme. To the abovementioned, a single rulebook is added, composed of  the 
Capital Requirements Regulation,11 the Capital Requirements Directive IV,12 the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive13 and the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive,14 
and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) for the direct recapitalisation of  banks 
in bankruptcy. With these three foundations, complemented by a single rulebook and 
the European Stability Mechanism, the creation of  the European Banking Union 
pursues a set of  core objectives for European financial stability, namely: strengthening 
the resilience of  the financial system; avoidance of  the “contagion effect”; distinction 
between the evolution of  sovereign debt and the evolution of  bank debt; containment 
of  public funding for bail-out operations; progress of  supervisory coordination towards 
decision harmonization; and preventing the fragmentation of  financial markets.15 
Faced with a troubled political scenario, as not all Member States have equally 
suffered the impact of  the 2007/2008 financial crisis, with peripheral European 
countries showing a greater degree of  impact (such as Portugal and Spain), and at a 
time when the European project was seen as being unreliable and synonymous with 
financial instability, it was decided to build the European Banking Union in stages, as 
it would be completely unrealistic to implement such a drastic overhaul of  the EU’s 
financial structure at a single moment.16 Thus, first the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
would be established, corresponding to the crisis prevention phase, followed by the 
Single Resolution Mechanism, associated with the early intervention phase and the 
crisis management phase and, finally, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, 
included in the crisis management phase. However, although the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism are currently in operation, the 
last pillar, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, has not yet been implemented. 
Establishing a parallelism between the construction of  the European Banking Union 
and the construction of  a common house, it can be seen that the two pillars of  the 
“house” have been built, because no “house” begins by the “roof ”, but without the 
“roof ”, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, the other two pillars can be affected 
by the “rains” and “storms” (crises) that may arise, with the two pillars ceasing to exist 
and causing the “house” to collapse.
11 See Regulation (EU) No. 575/2013 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council, of  26 June, on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) 
no 648/2012.
12 See Directive No. 2013/36/EU of  the European Parliament and of  the Council, of  26 June, on 
access to the activity of  credit institutions and the prudential supervision of  credit institutions and 
investment firms.
13 See Directive No. 2014/59/EU of  the European Parliament and of  the Council, of  15 May, 
establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of  credit institutions and investment firms.
14 See Directive No. 2014/49/EU of  the European Parliament and of  the Council, of  16 April, on 
deposit guarantee schemes.
15 See José Manuel Quelhas, “Dos objetivos da União Bancária”, in Boletim de Ciências Económicas, vol. 
LV (Coimbra: Coimbra University, Law School, 2012), 237-286, https://digitalis.uc.pt/pt-pt/artigo/
dos_objetivos_da_uni%C3%A3o_banc%C3%A1ria.
16 See Nicolas Véron, “Europe’s Single Supervisory Mechanism and Long Journey Towards Banking 
Union”, 10.
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The concern about the completion of  the European Banking Union, more 
specifically the implementation of  the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, first 
appeared in June 2015 with the Report “Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union”17 
(also known as the “Report of  the Five Presidents”), prepared jointly by Jean-Claude 
Juncker (President of  the European Commission), Donald Tusk (President of  the Euro 
Summit), Jeroen Dijsselbloem (President of  the Eurogroup), Mario Draghi (President of  
the European Central Bank) and Martin Schulz (President of  the European Parliament), 
which underlines the importance of  making new developments in the “four building 
blocks” (Economic Union, Financial Union, Monetary Union and Budgetary Union). 
In the aftermath of  this Report, which determined the completion of  the European 
Banking Union and the launch of  a true Capital Markets Union, several documents and 
communications18 emerged, which pre-determined a consensus on the completion of  
the European Banking Union by the year 2019, with the European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme, a last resort common fiscal backstop for the Single Resolution Fund and the 
Capital Markets Union being established and operational by 2025.
However, we are in the first half  of  2020 and there is still no concrete agreement 
for the conclusion of  a European Banking Union, with the opposition of  several 
countries, mainly Germany, that refuse to reach a consensus, as they do not intend that 
in the near future, they are called upon to endure the “problems” of  banks in countries 
with an overpriced level of  “bad credit” (the case of  countries such as Portugal, Italy 
and Greece), with the conclusion of  the European Banking Union to be realized and 
without fixing itself  a concrete deadline for its outcome. Although there is no fixed 
date for the completion of  this European project, a complete banking union with the 
condescension of  Germany is no longer a “mirage”, hoping that the implementation of  
the third pillar of  this will be near.
Therefore, the European Banking Union, although incomplete, is undoubtedly 
the most proficient decision taken that coincides with financial integration in the EU, 
changing almost completely the scenario of  banking regulation and supervision in 
Europe. This European project translates a greater accentuation of  the Europeanization 
of  banking regulation and supervision, since the decisions regarding these will be taken 
at a supranational level, although banking regulation and supervision still have a small 
national component (such as, for example, the supervision of  less significant credit 
institutions). Now the EU has the “baton”, directing and controlling the banking 
supervision of  the members of  the Banking Union, so that there is harmony and 
stability in the banking markets.
17 See Jean-Claude Junker et al., Concluir a União Económica e Monetária Europeia (Bruxelas: 
Comissão Europeia, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/5-presidents-
report_pt.pdf.
18 eg. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions, 
“Towards the completion of  the Banking Union”, of  24 November 2015, COM(2015) 587 final, 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PT/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0587&from=EN; 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
European Central Bank, on steps towards Completing Economic and Monetary Union, of  
21 October 2015, COM(2015) 587 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PT/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0587&from=EN; “Council Conclusions on a roadmap to complete 
the Banking Union”, European Council, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2016/06/17/conclusions-on-banking-union/; Reflection paper on the deepening of  the 
economic and monetary union, of  31 May 2017, COM(2017) 291, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-emu_pt.pdf. 
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Superficially, we think it is pertinent to talk about the functioning of  each of  the 
pillars of  the Banking Union. Let’s start with the first to be created and implemented: 
The Single Supervisory Mechanism.
2. Single Supervisory Mechanism
The first pillar of  the Banking Union, the Single Supervisory Mechanism, is the 
direct result of  a process launched by the European Commission, whose proposal was 
published on 12 September 2012 and discussed with great speed in the Council. The 
Single Supervisory Mechanism came into force, with the European Central Bank fully 
assuming its supervisory role, on 4 November 2014.19
This pillar is a European system for the prudential supervision of  credit institutions 
located in the Euro area and in EU Member States outside the Euro area, but which 
have decided to join this mechanism, in other words, this mechanism is integrated 
only by the Euro area Member States (the case of  Portugal), with the remaining EU 
Member States (the case of  the United Kingdom and Sweden) being excluded, unless 
those Member States wishing to cooperate closely with the European Central Bank 
by concluding a Memorandum of  Understanding (Articles 3, 6 and 7 of  Regulation 
No. 1024/2013). As such, Brexit does not influence the functioning of  the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism or the functioning of  the Banking Union because the United 
Kingdom is not a participating member.
Initially, one of  the grounds against the European Central Bank involvement in 
supervision was the potential risk of  conflicts of  interest between monetary policy 
functions and supervisory functions. According to Article 127 (1) of  the Treaty on 
the Functioning of  the European Union, the European Central Bank is responsible 
for the monetary policy function, with a view to price stability. However, paragraph 
6 of  the same Article provides the possibility of  granting the European Central Bank 
the functions associated with policies relating to the prudential supervision of  credit 
institutions and other financial institutions. In accordance with Article 25 of  the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism Regulation and the European Central Bank Decision of  17 
September 2014 (Decision ECB/2014/39), the monetary policy function and the 
supervisory function need to be performed autonomously, insofar as this separation 
of  functions extends to the European Central Bank tasks related to the European 
Systemic Risk Board and other tasks and is required by the potential risk of  “cross-
contamination”20 between banking supervision and monetary policy. In this path, alongside 
the European Central Bank as the only decision-making body, the European Central 
Bank Council is responsible for holding separate meetings and agendas for each of  
these matters [Article 25 (4)] of  Regulation No. 1024/2013] as the Supervisory Board 
(provided for in Article 26 of  Regulation No. 1024/2013) has been established within 
the “Bank” and is responsible for planning and carrying out the European Central 
Bank supervisory tasks and for drafting and presenting proposals to the European 
Central Bank Council. Insofar, a mediation panel was created, with the objective of  
effecting the separation between the monetary policy function and the supervisory 
19 See Eddy Wymeersch, “The Single Supervisory Mechanism or ‘SSM’ Part One of  the Banking 
Union”, National Bank of  Belgium Working Paper Research, No. 255 (April 2014): 1-7, https://www.nbb.
be/doc/oc/repec/reswpp/wp255en.pdf.
20 Expression used by Eilis Ferran e Valia Babis in “The European Single Supervisory Mechanism”, 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series of  Faculty of  Law of  University of  Cambridge, No. 10 (March of  2013): 
12, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2224538.
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functions and of  resolving the oppositions expressed by the competent national 
authorities of  each participating Member State regarding the objections developed by 
the European Central Bank Council to a project of  the Supervisory Board [Article 25 
(5) of  Regulation No. 1024/2013].
Putting Article 127 (1) of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union 
and the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation [motivated by Article 127 (6) of  
the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union] face to face, through our 
interpretation we conclude that Article 127 (1) and (6) of  the Treaty on the Functioning 
of  the European Union regard the monetary policy function as the primary function 
of  the European Central Bank, since the word “can” in paragraph 6 reveals an 
optional nature of  the European Central Bank supervisory functions, while the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism Regulation considers the European Central Bank supervisory 
functions as basic, highlighting the objective of  the stability of  the European financial 
system and relativising the objective of  maintaining price stability inherent in monetary 
policy. Nevertheless, the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union is an 
original law (also called Primary law) and the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation 
is a Secondary law, with the monetary policy function prevailing over the supervisory 
functions.
It should be noted that the thesis concerning the violation of  the Treaty on the 
Functioning of  the European Union by the meeting of  the monetary policy function 
and the supervisory functions at the European Central Bank is to be rejected, as Article 
127 (1) and (6) of  the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union prevents the 
possibility of  cohabiting in the European Central Bank these functions concerning 
different matters. While the task of  safeguarding financial stability is ideal for European 
Banking Authority, the Meroni case-law21 does not allow for powers or tasks that 
include the adoption of  economic decisions to institutions that are not provided for 
in the Treaties, for example, the case of  the Authorities European Supervisory.22 In 
addition, although the coexistence of  the monetary policy function and the supervisory 
functions at the European Central Bank is seen as negative, synergistic advantages are 
identified in the opposite direction, namely the fact that these two types of  functions 
– when cohabiting in the same EU institution – allow a greater celerity and efficiency 
in the exchange of  information between supervision and monetary policy, facilitating 
the European Central Bank performance in the European System of  Central Banks 
context and in the field of  supervision.
The Single Supervisory Mechanism, like the Single Resolution Mechanism and 
the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, has as its main objective “to disconnect the 
21 The Meroni case law was very important, since it proclaimed a principle, the principle of  institutional 
balance, which was not previously included in the Treaties, this principle that set limits to the delegation 
of  powers to regulatory agencies / authorities. This principle arises in situations where there may be 
a delegation of  powers to a body other than the one provided for in the Treaties, especially if  the 
authority to which the powers are delegated is not legitimated by the Treaties for these purposes (the 
case of  European Banking Authority or any other European Supervisory Authority). See Judgment 
of  the Court of  Justice of  the European Union, Aldo Meroni against the High Authority, of  13 June 1958, 
Case C- 9/56 and Carlos Filipe Fernandes de Andrade Costa, O mecanismo único de supervisão no quadro 
da União Bancária Europeia, 166-191.
22 See Maria Emília Teixeira and Gil Valente Maia, “A supervisão do sistema financeiro: a experiência 
europeia e americana”, in O direito atual e as novas fronteiras jurídicas, coord. Irene Portela (Barcelos: 
Centro de Investigação Jurídica Aplicada, 2017), 157-158, http://repositorio.uportu.pt/jspui/
bitstream/11328/1734/1/A%20supervis%C3%A3o%20do%20sistema%20financeiro_a%20
experi%C3%AAncia%20europeia%20e%20americana.pdf.
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.institution-risk from the country-risk” and provide instruments to the European institutions 
to mitigate or prevent the effects of  a new financial crisis.23 However, it was established, 
when the decision to create a genuine European Banking Union was taken, that a 
Single Supervisory Mechanism would not be sufficient to separate bank debt and 
sovereign debt, appearing as necessary for this purpose, the subsequent institution of  a 
mechanism for the resolution of  insolvent credit institutions (a supranational Deposit 
Guarantee System) responsible for protecting depositors, and a European mechanism 
for the direct recapitalisation of  credit institutions (the European Stability Mechanism).
Despite what has been said previously, there is a Single Supervisory Mechanism 
and not a Single Supervisory Authority, that is, the responsibility for banking supervision 
in the participating Member States is not entirely underestimated. In fact, there is 
a division of  the daily supervisory tasks of  banks between the European Central 
Bank and the competent national authorities, although the European Central Bank 
is the supreme prudential authority.24 What was sought with the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism was to centralize a single banking supervision mechanism at the European 
Central Bank and to unify banking supervision for the whole Euro area, including the 
competent national authorities as active parts of  domestic banking supervision in the 
Member States making up the Single Supervisory Mechanism [Article 6 (1) of  the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation].
As mentioned above, the Single Supervisory Mechanism is composed of  the 
European Central Bank and the competent national authorities of  the nineteen Euro 
area Member States, where the first assumes a leading role as “responsible for the effective 
and consistent operation of  the Single Supervisory Mechanism” [Article 6 (1) of  Regulation No. 
1024/2013]. The European Central Bank assumes distinct powers from the competent 
national authorities, performing certain functions regardless of  the size or systemic 
importance of  the credit institution, namely 1) the granting or the withdrawal of  the 
authorisation of  credit institutions, 2) the evaluation of  notifications for the acquisition 
and sale of  qualifying holdings in credit institutions, 3) the functions related to financial 
conglomerates, 4) the functions related to cooperation with European Banking 
Authority and 5) macroprudential decisions (Articles 4 - specific powers of  micro-
prudential supervision - and 5 - specific powers of  macro-prudential supervision - 
of  Regulation No. 1024/2013).25 However, except for the aforementioned functions 
exercised exclusively by the European Central Bank, the distribution of  the remaining 
functions of  direct prudential supervision between the European Central Bank and 
the competent national authorities is effected by the distinction between “significant 
entities/institutions” and “less significant institutions”. The direct supervision of  significant 
institutions is the responsibility of  the European Central Bank, while the direct 
supervision of  less significant institutions is the responsibility of  the competent 
national authorities of  the nineteen Euro area Member States, although the European 
Central Bank performs indirect supervision tasks on less significant institutions [Article 
6 (5) of  Regulation No. 1024/2013 and Articles 67 to 69 of  Regulation No. 468/2014], 
as the competent national authorities assist the European Central Bank in the direct 
23 See Inês Palma Ramalho, “O mecanismo único de supervisão: uma breve análise sobre os desafios 
da sua implementação”, Revista de Direito das Sociedades, VII, No. 2 (2015): 405.
24 See Rui do Carmo, “The Single Supervisory Mechanism in the context of  a European Banking 
Union under construction: bridging the Euro debt crisis with defences designed for the future”, 74.
25 See Roberto Ugena Torrejón, “El mecanismo único de supervisión europeo”, Revista de Derecho 
de la Unión Europea, No. 27-28 (July-December, 2014): 145-146, http://revistas.uned.es/index.php/
REDUE/article/view/13612.
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supervision of  significant institutions. Therefore, it will be useful to know how the 
significant institutions and the less significant institutions are classified for a better 
understanding between the tasks of  the European Central Bank and the competent 
national authorities.
What requirements are used to qualify an institution as significant or less 
significant? The answer to this question is found in Article 6 (4) of  the Single 
Supervisory Regulation, which provides a set of  quantitative and qualitative 
requirements that are indispensable for attributing or not attributing to a credit 
institution a “label” of  significance. 
All credit institutions that meet one of  the qualitative or quantitative requirements 
provided in the previous articles are subject to direct supervision by the European 
Central Bank, each of  these significant credit institutions being individually supervised 
through Joint Supervisory Teams (composed of  members of  the European Central 
Bank and members of  the competent national authorities) established by that.26 
Currently, the European Central Bank assumes the direct supervision of  119 banking 
groups through its supervisory and investigative powers27, including these: Caixa 
Geral de Depósitos, BCP and LSF Nani Investments.28 29 The other credit institutions 
(for example, in Portugal, the Caixa de Crédito Agrícola and Montepio) are subject 
to direct supervision by the competent national authorities in close cooperation with 
the European Central Bank (responsible for indirect supervision), although there is 
still the possibility that the European Central Bank may consider them as significant. 
It should be noted that a credit institution can move from a significant institution to 
a less significant institution, just as the opposite can happen, changing the authority 
responsible for its supervision.
In addition, the role of  the competent national authorities in the supervision 
of  less significant institutions is conditioned by the European Central Bank by 
issuing regulations, guidelines or general instructions [Article 6(5)(a) of  the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism Regulation], as well as by the European Central Bank 
decision, either on its own initiative or after consultation or request from one of  the 
competent national authorities, to directly supervise institutions that have indirectly 
requested or received financial assistance from the European Financial Stability 
Facility or the European Stability Mechanism, in accordance with Article 6(5)(b) of  
Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation and Articles 67 to 69 of  Regulation No. 
468/2014.
In short, the European Central Bank is generally responsible for the smooth 
and consistent functioning of  the Single Supervisory Mechanism, for the direct 
supervision of  significant institutions and the indirect supervision of  less significant 
institutions, while the competent national authorities are responsible for the direct 
supervision of  less significant institutions and to assist the European Central Bank in 
direct supervision of  significant institutions, revealing the role of  national authorities 
in a kind of  delegation of  powers by the European Central Bank, since the European 
26 See Articles 3 to 6 of  Regulation (EU) No. 468/2014 of  the European Central Bank, of  16 April.
27 See Articles 9 to 18 of  Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013, of  15 October.
28 See List of  supervised entities of  2018, accessed June 1, 2019, available at https://www.
bankingsupervision.europa.eu/ecb/pub/pdf/ssm.list_of_supervised_entities_201812.en.pdf.
29 About the direct supervision of  LSF Nani Investments by the European Central Bank see Diogo 
Cavaleiro, “Nani Investments rouba ao Novo Banco o foco da supervisão direta do BCE”, Jornal de 
Negócios, December 15, 2018, https://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/empresas/banca---financas/detalhe/
nani-investments-rouba-ao-novo-banco-o-foco-da-supervisao-directa-do-bce.
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Central Bank can assume the direct supervision of  less significant institutions 
delegated to the competent national authorities.30
According to Article 3(1) of  the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation, in 
addition to the exchange of  information with the competent national authorities and 
close cooperation with Member States outside the Euro area, the European Central 
Bank must cooperate with the three European Supervisory Authorities and with the 
European Systemic Risk Board. However, the European Central Bank must perform 
its functions under the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation, without infringing 
the powers and competences of  any of  the three European Supervisory Authorities. 
Focusing on cooperation between the European Central Bank and European Banking 
Authority, while the latter is responsible for drawing up technical standards and issuing 
guidelines and recommendations, both with a view to harmonizing supervisory 
practices, the European Central Bank may only adopt recommendations, guidelines or 
regulations in respect for the applicable EU legislation when it is strictly necessary to 
structure and discriminate the modalities for the exercise of  the tasks assigned to it by 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism Regulation, with the European Central Bank being 
subject to the binding regulatory and implementing technical standards formulated 
by the European Banking Authority and accepted by the Commission [Article 4(3) 
of  Regulation No. 1024/2013]. Furthermore, the European Central Bank should 
contribute to the development of  draft regulatory technical standards or implementing 
technical standards or point out to European Banking Authority the inevitability 
of  submitting draft standards to the Commission that modify present regulatory or 
implementing technical standards [in line with the provisions in Regulation (EU) No. 
1093/2010].
In conclusion, the Single Supervisory Mechanism is the pillar of  the European 
Banking Union, financed by the supervision fees to be charged to credit institutions 
established in participating Member States and branches established in a participating 
Member State by a credit institution established in a non-participating Member State 
(fee calculated by the credit institution’s risk profile)31, which enables the performance 
of  banking supervision within a system integrated by the European Central Bank 
and the competent national authorities of  the participating Member States, under the 
ultimate responsibility of  the first, with due respect by the separation between the 
supervisory functions and the monetary policy functions, by the Internal Market and 
by the standards established by the European Banking Authority, and open to all States 
that do not belong to the Euro area. The objectives of  this integrated supervisory 
system will always be to safeguard the security and liquidity of  the European banking 
system, to stimulate integration and financial stability on the European continent, as well 
as to ensure coherent and effective supervision based on the exchange of  knowledge 
and information between the competent national authorities and the European Central 
Bank.
3. Single Resolution Mechanism
The creation of  the second pillar of  the European Banking Union, the Single 
Resolution Mechanism, was agreed by the European Parliament and the Council on 
March 2014, with the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation appearing in July of  the 
30 See Roberto Ugena Torrejón, “El Mecanismo Único de Supervisión Europeo”, 146.
31 See article 30 of  Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013, of  15 October.
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same year, which determines the rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of  
credit institutions and certain investment firms in the context of  an authentic Single 
Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund.32 However, the Single Resolution 
Mechanism would only become fully operational in 2016.
The creation of  a common resolution33 mechanism in the European scenario 
was motivated by the inability of  the Single Supervisory Mechanism alone to break 
the vicious cycle between bank debt and sovereign debt, since it does not prevent 
taxpayers from supporting the bank debt, and by the need for a mechanism that acts 
differently and at a different time point than the Single Supervisory Mechanism. While 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism located in a preventive phase, acts before a crisis 
occurs and in order to prevent its emergence, the Single Resolution Mechanism acts 
simultaneously in an early intervention phase, a phase that includes the intervention 
of  supervisors in a credit institution in situations of  financial instability through the 
imposition of  recovery plans (such as, for example, the appointment of  a new team 
and the meeting of  shareholders to discuss the necessary reforms), plans prior to the 
need to prepare resolution plans that will only start in the event of  the impossibility 
of  recovering the credit institution (measures such as, for example, the transfer of  
assets to a transition institution, the reduction and conversion of  equity instruments), 
and in a crisis management phase, a phase in which taxpayer protection is prioritised, 
the resolution of  credit institutions and the defence of  depositors (through Directive 
2014/49/EU and a future European Deposit Insurance Scheme).34 35 As such, the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism complement 
each other, with the first supervising all banking activity in the Euro area and eventually 
“activating” the Single Resolution Mechanism when it observes an anomaly in a credit 
institution and the second gives continuity to the fulfilment of  the values of  financial 
stability and of  due protection to the banking clients-consumers (and all taxpayers) at 
a time when the Single Supervisory Mechanism and, basically, the isolated supervision 
do not have the ability to achieve these purposes.36
The Single Resolution Mechanism is applicable to the same institutions of  the 
Member States participating in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (credit institutions 
established in participating Member States, parent companies established in a 
participating Member State subject to consolidated supervision by the European 
Central Bank and financial institutions and investment firms established in a 
32 See Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council, of  15 July.
33 According to Articles 2 No. 1, 31, 32 and Recital 45 of  the Bank Recovery and Resolution directive, 
the resolution can be defined as the complex of  measures applicable to a credit institution in a situation 
or at risk of  insolvency, with a view to maintaining financial stability and mitigating the effects of  
contagion for other credit institutions, with the resolution it is an alternative to the usual insolvency 
process, this commonly known to shift huge imbalances to the financial system and the contagion 
effect to other similar institutions, as well as affecting the legal protection of  bank customers.
34 See Cristina Casalinho, “União Bancária: Avanços recentes e futuros desenvolvimentos”, 5-6.
35 See João Paulo Vasconcelos Raposo, “Regime europeu de recuperação e resolução de instituições 




36 See Ivana Souto de Medeiros, “A resolução bancária e a salvaguarda do erário público na União 
Europeia: do bail-out ao bail-in”, Revista de Concorrência e Regulação, No. 33-34 (January-June 2018): 71, 
http://www.concorrencia.pt/vPT/Estudos_e_Publicacoes/Revista_CR/Documents/Revista%20
C_R%2033-34.pdf.
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participating Member State, when they are subject to supervision on a consolidated 
basis of  the parent company implemented by the European Central Bank - Articles 2 
and 4 of  Regulation No. 806/2014), in other words, it is applicable to all institutions 
located in Member States Euro area participants plus all Member States which have 
not adopted the Euro as their official currency but which decide to participate in the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism, with close cooperation between the European Central 
Bank and the competent national authorities of  that Member State [in accordance with 
Articles 2 (1) and 7 of  Regulation No. 1024/2013).
It should be noted that this mechanism operates on the Union scene, but forks on 
a substantive aspect, applicable to all EU Member States, and on a procedural aspect, 
applicable only to the Member States that integrate into the Euro area. The substantive 
aspect concerns the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, which is responsible for 
unifying the legal systems of  the EU Member States with regard to the recovery and 
resolution of  credit institutions. Uniformity, which is primarily concerned with the 
objective of  protecting taxpayers in bank resolution situations, replacing the bail-out 
mechanisms with bail-in mechanisms, the procedural aspect or the Single Resolution 
Mechanism itself  determines a Community decision mechanism that can be extended 
to all Euro area Member States, in which there is the Single Resolution Board, which 
has the power of  initiative in the scope of  the resolution and is responsible for 
submitting decision proposals to the Commission, and a complementary Fund, the 
Single Resolution Fund.37 It should be noted that, although the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive came into force in 2014, that is, before the Single Resolution 
Mechanism was in place, and is placed in a different aspect of  the Single Mechanism, 
being applicable to all EU Member States does not mean that the Single Resolution 
Mechanism does not apply the rules within the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive; 
on the contrary, since the Single Resolution Mechanism will apply the rules of  that 
Directive in the bank recovery and resolution procedure, it will only for Member States 
which are part of  the Euro area.
After our mention in the previous paragraph, it has already been noted that the 
second pillar of  the European Banking Union is constituted by the Single Resolution 
Board, with legal personality and holder of  the most extensive legal capacity attributed 
to legal persons at national level, and supported by a fund, the Single Resolution Fund.38
Starting with the first, the Single Resolution Board (an EU agency composed of  
a President, four permanent members and a representative from each of  the national 
resolution authorities) was established in January 2015 as the European Banking 
Union resolution authority responsible for good and coherent functioning of  the 
Single Resolution Mechanism.39 The Single Resolution Board, representative of  the 
national resolution authorities, exercises the responsibilities and powers that, according 
to the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, should be exercised by the national 
resolution authorities. The Single Resolution Board is responsible for formulating 
resolution plans and adopting all resolution decisions (or it would not be designated 
as the central decision-making body of  the Single Resolution Mechanism) whenever 
it is a Euro area credit institution, parent companies established in a participating 
Member State subject to the consolidated supervision of  the European Central Bank, 
investment firms and other financial institutions that are established in a participating 
37 See Carlos Costa, “Processo de Construção da União Bancária: Balanço e Perspetivas”, 8-9.
38 See articles 1 and 42 No. 1 and 2 of  Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014.
39 See articles 7, No. 1, 42, No. 1 and 43, No.1 of  Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014.
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Member State and subject to consolidated supervision of  the parent company, groups 
not qualified as less significant and subject to direct supervision by the European 
Central Bank [according to Article 6 (4) of  Regulation No. 1024/2013] or groups in 
respect of  which the European Central Bank has taken the decision to exercise all 
powers [according to Article 6 (5) of  Regulation No. 1024/2013], cross-border groups 
and whenever the situations explained in Article 7 (4) (b), and (5) are observed.40 In 
relation to the other entities and groups not provided for in (2), the national resolution 
authorities (in the case of  Portugal the national resolution authority is, at present, the 
Bank of  Portugal, but in the near future it may be the Resolution and Warranty Systems 
Administration Authority, if  the reform Portuguese model will be implemented in the 
next parliamentary term) are responsible for the elaboration of  resolution plans and 
for the adoption of  bank resolution decisions in close articulation and cooperation 
with the Single Resolution Board.41
The Single Resolution Fund, which is owned and managed by the Single Resolution 
Board, is a financing mechanism for bank resolution measures capitalised through the 
transfer and mutualisation of  national funds by the institutions of  the Member States 
participating in the Single Supervisory Mechanism, transfer and mutualisation provided 
in the intergovernmental agreement42 concluded in May 2014 by the participating 
Member States of  the European Banking Union, in which the Member States agreed to 
allocate to the Single Resolution Fund the contributions subject to national collection 
(in the case of  Portugal it was approved by the Portuguese Parliament Resolution No. 
129/2015, of  22 July)43, that is, the Single Resolution Fund is a fund based on national 
compartments that will gradually be converted into a common fund. The Fund is 
financed through contributions (ex-ante and, if  previous ones are insufficient, ex-post) 
from credit institutions in participating Member States, although ex post contributions 
will only be charged to credit institutions when financial means are insufficient to cover 
losses, costs or expenses arising from the use of  the FUR in the context of  resolution 
actions, that is, when ex-ante contributions are insufficient.44
The process of  capitalisation of  the Single Resolution Fund and mutualisation of  
its funds began in January 2016 and is expected to be completed by the end of  2023 
(initial period of  eight years), whereas the available resources of  the Single Resolution 
Fund in that year are at least 1% of  the value of  the covered deposits of  all credit 
institutions established in the participating Member States, with a minimum value of  
EUR 55 billion estimated and the achievement of  100% mutualisation. On 24 July 
2018, the Single Resolution Board announced that until that date, it had collected 
more than 7.5 billion euros in annual ex ante contributions to the Single Resolution 
Fund, having since 2016 collected a total of  24.9 billion euros, that is, about five and 
a half  years were left until the end of  the initial period and almost half  of  what was 
expected at the end of  the 8 years had already been collected.45 In the meantime, the 
40 See articles 5, No. 1, 7, No. 2 and 8, No. 1 of  Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014.
41 See articles 7, No. 2, 8, No. 2, 3 and 4, 28 and 30 of  Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014.
42 For greater depth see Intergovernmental Agreement on the Transfer and Mutualisation of  Contributions 
to the Single Resolution Fund, of  May 2014, accessed 16 March, 2019, available at https://www.ris.bka.
gv.at/Dokumente/RegV/REGV_COO_2026_100_2_1105493/COO_2026_100_2_1106424.pdf.
43 See Portuguese Parliament Resolution No. 129/2015, of  22 July, https://dre.pt/home/-/dre/70179159/
details/maximized?p_auth=4d4pdJo8.
44 See articles 67, 69, No. 1, 70, 71, 75, No. 1 of  Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014.
45 See “Banking Union”, European Parliament, accessed May 24, 2019, available at http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/factsheets/pt/sheet/88/uniao-bancaria.
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total amount of  ex ante annual contributions for 2019, collected in June, increased 
compared to 2018 and is 7.819 billion Euros.46
However, the common fiscal backstop, in general for the European Banking 
Union and specifically for the Single Resolution Fund, necessary for an efficient 
resolution of  credit institutions and ideal for preventing costs for taxpayers, has not 
yet been created, with Member States making a commitment to create this mechanism 
in 2013. It was only on 14 June that the finance ministers of  the Member States, at 
the Eurogroup meeting, agreed on the Treaty that strengthens the European Stability 
Mechanism as a mechanism to support the Single Resolution Fund, a mechanism that is 
essential for the Single Resolution Mechanism to be effective in matters of  resolution, 
since in the event of  a financial crisis that affects several banks at the same time, the 
resolution measures for these banks may exceed the available resources contained in 
the Single Resolution Fund and it is in these situations that a common fiscal backstop 
is activated, preventing it from going back “to square one” and that the European 
Banking Union proves to be another failed European project.47 Therefore, it is time to 
establish an European Stability Mechanism credit line in favor of  the Single Resolution 
Fund, with the necessary adaptations, before a new international financial crisis arises 
and the Single Resolution Mechanism (including the Single Resolution Fund) proves 
to be insufficient to resolve insolvent institutions, as in 2008, with the lack of  a Single 
Resolution Mechanism, in which supervision and resolution proved to be ineffective.
Although many changes were made in terms of  banking resolution, the maximum 
exponent of  the paradigm shift in European banking resolution was the internal 
recapitalisation instrument also known as bail-in (provided for in Articles 43 and 44 of  
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive). The internal recapitalisation instrument, 
among so many others, is the most relevant instrument of  resolution, since it is, through 
it, that the link between bank debt and sovereign debt can be broken, thus protecting 
taxpayers and States. Although the Member States were obliged to transpose this same 
Directive into national law by 1 January 2015, with most of  the resolution instruments 
in force from that date, the bail-in instrument should only be transposed from 1 
January 2016, coinciding with the date on which the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
began operating.48
If  with the financial crisis of  2007/2008 there was the use of  public money, 
collected from taxpayers, to prevent the bankruptcy of  private banks, with the 
emergence in the future of  a potential crisis, the same will not happen. We know that 
bail-out is synonymous with taking great risks capable of  disturbing the stability of  the 
financial system as a whole, creating the vicious circle between banks and the State and 
feeding the hope of  banks “too big to fail” that they will be always rescued by the State, 
so that, in their perspective, they do not have to be cautious in their management or 
any kind of  consideration in their risky actions, because, due to their relevance to the 
national economy, they will be rescued by the State (the so-called moral hazard).
46 See “2019 ex-ante contributions”, Single Resolution Board, accessed July 1, 2019, available at 
https://srb.europa.eu/en/content/2019-ex-ante-contributions.
47 See Reflection Paper on the Deepening of  the Economic and Monetary Union, COM(2017) 
291, 20, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-emu_pt.pdf, 
accessed July 1, 2019.
48 See João Freitas, “Um mecanismo de resolução para a União bancária: fundamentos e configuração”, 
Relatório de Estabilidade Financeira (2014): 101, https://www.bportugal.pt/sites/default/files/anexos/
papers/ar201402_p.pdf.
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The bail-in, designed to overcome the negative consequences associated with bail-
out, is associated with the polluter-pays principle of  Environmental Law, a principle 
that blames the authors of  environmental damage for their practices with an impact 
on the environment. This, in the banking field, translates into the accountability 
of  those who cause damages with an impact on financial stability through their 
activity.49 But what does this instrument consist of? Bail-in is a resolution instrument 
that encourages the absorption of  losses and the internal recapitalisation of  a credit 
institution at risk of  insolvency through a process led by a resolution authority that 
will perform the reduction and conversion powers regarding liabilities of  that credit 
institution.50 In this way, this resolution instrument places the burden of  rescuing the 
credit institution  at risk of  insolvency on shareholders and creditors (through the 
principle of  fair treatment), instead of  placing the burden of  rescuing on taxpayers 
and States. It should be noted that the fact that the burden of  losses of  a credit 
institution falls primarily on shareholders and creditors has a stimulating effect with 
respect to their control and surveillance on health of  a credit institution’s financial 
situation in normal circumstances prior to insolvency situations, since shareholders 
and creditors will have preference in assiduously monitoring the credit institution, 
instead of  being called upon to recapitalise that same institution in a situation of  
insolvency, thus promoting healthy and prudent banking management and increasing 
the liability inherent to economic operators.51
However, although the burden of  rescuing banks at risk of  insolvency is 
handed over primitively to shareholders and creditors, it does not mean that the 
public purse will not be called upon to bear the financial imbalances of  the banks, 
but will only be a last resort, in the other words, the use of  state support will be 
absolutely extraordinary.52
Before concluding this point, we recall that Banco Popular (currently owned by 
Santander) was the “test tube” for the first European resolution experiment within 
the scope of  the Single Resolution Mechanism.53 Banco Popular was resolved through 
the sale of  a business tool, whose acquirer was Banco Santander, revealing itself  to 
be the first European resolution, with the debut of  the Single Resolution Board, an 
exemplary resolution exempt from deposit runs and market disruptions. Portuguese 
banks (BES and Banif) were also subject to resolution, but a national resolution 
whose decision belonged to the national resolution authority, Bank of  Portugal, since 
the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the Single Resolution Mechanism 
49 See Anna Gardella, “Bail-in and the two dimensions of  burden-sharing”, in ECB Legal Conference 2015: 
From Monetary Union to Banking Union, on the way to Capital Markets Union (Frankfurt: European Central Bank, 
2015), 207, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/frommonetaryuniontobankingunion201512.
en.pdf.
50 See Ivana Souto de Medeiros, “A Resolução Bancária e a Salvaguarda do Erário Público na União 
Europeia: do bail-out ao bail-in”, 86.
51 For a better understanding of  how the priority principle works in the context of  credit institution 
resolution see Pedro Machado, “Bail-in as new paradigm for bank resolution: Discretion and the duty 
of  care”, Revista Eletrónica de Direito Público, vol. 3, No. 1 (April 2016): 36-37, https://www.e-publica.
pt/volumes/v3n1/pdf/Vol.3-N%C2%BA1-Art.03.pdf  and André Mendes Barata, “Mecanismo 
único de Resolução: Análise à luz do caso BES”, 127.
52 See articles 34, No. 1, a) and b), 44, No. 7 47, No. 1, 48, No. 1, 56, 57, 58, 99, 100, 103, 104, 105 and 
109, No. 1 of  the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive.
53 See “Press release on the sale of  Banco Popular Portugal”, Bank of  Portugal, accessed May 25, 
2019, available at https://www.bportugal.pt/comunicado/comunicado-do-banco-de-portugal-sobre-
venda-do-banco-popular-portugal.
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had not entered into force. With regard to BES, this was resolved by dividing the 
bank into “bad bank” and “good bank”, with assets related to the non-financial area 
remaining in the former (BES) and the remaining assets transferred to a bridge bank 
(Novo Banco), noting that one of  the resolution instruments stipulated by the Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive was applied to this Portuguese bank before its 
entry into force. As for Banif, its assets and liabilities were sold to Santander, and the 
bank was not sold as was the case with Banco Popular. But what is the big difference 
in the resolution of  these three credit institutions, in addition to one being carried out 
at European level and the rest being resolved at national level? The big difference is 
that the resolution of  Banif  and BES involved the rescue of  the State and, indirectly, 
of  the taxpayers (the so-called bail-out), with the Portuguese State having injected 3.9 
billion euros in BES’s resolution (an amount covered by the condition of  future sale 
of  Novo Banco) and 3 billion euros in Banif ’s resolution, while Banco Popular did 
not interfere in the taxpayers’ “pocket” and ended up being absorbed by Santander 
through the use of  its shareholders who injected 7 billion euros.54
In a conclusive way, we end this point with the idea that the Single Resolution 
Mechanism, linked to the Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive, will be the pillar 
that will partially break the link between bank debt and sovereign debt, partially because 
it does not exclude the resource to public state support, even if  it arises in strictly 
extraordinary cases. In addition, the Single Resolution Mechanism in conjunction 
with the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive safeguards the orderly resolution 
of  credit institutions at risk of  insolvency, provides a more efficient bank resolution 
regime than the one previously established at the national level, limits the costs of  
taxpayers and the public purse, primarily puts the burden of  rescue for bank losses 
on shareholders and creditors, safeguards depositors holding bank accounts with a 
balance of  less than EUR 100 000 and, also, removes the liabilities of  natural persons 
and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises from the application of  reduction or 
conversion powers. The Single Resolution Mechanism is, undoubtedly, an innovative 
pillar that comes to attribute some justice with respect to the responsibility for the 
insolvency of  a certain credit institution and that comes to complement the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism, a pillar focused on the supervision in matters of  resolution. 
4. European Deposit Insurance Scheme
As mentioned earlier, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme is the pillar of  
the European Banking Union that, together with the common fiscal backstop, remains 
to be implemented. It was predicted that the European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
would be agreed in 2019 and would be operational by 202555, but as revealed by the 
Eurogroup meeting, the third pillar of  the European Banking Union is a long way 
from its achievement and without any predefined date, with the completion of  the 
Banking Union and the deepening of  Economic and Monetary Union pending.
54 For a better understanding of  the resolution of  previous credit institutions see Carolina Mendes, 
“Regulação financeira e supervisão bancária: análise crítica das problemáticas do BPN, BPP, BES e Banif ” 
(Master’s thesis, University of  Coimbra, 2016), 124-150, https://eg.uc.pt/bitstream/10316/42979/2/
Carolina%20Mendes.pdf  and Clara Rodrigues, “O mecanismo de resolução bancária na insolvência” 
(Master’s thesis, University of  the Minho, 2017), 69-95, https://repositorium.sdum.uminho.pt/
bitstream/1822/50998/1/Clara%20Alexandra%20Quintela%20Alves%20Rodrigues.pdf.
55 See Reflection paper on the deepening of  the economic and monetary union, of  31 May 2017, 
COM(2017) 291, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-emu_
pt.pdf.
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 6, No. 1,  January 2020
95 Vitor Carlos Almeida da Silva
The European Deposit Insurance Scheme was designed to act in line with 
the Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive56 and, in the crisis management phase, 
in conjunction with the Single Resolution Mechanism and the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive. After an observation that the Deposit Guarantee Schemes are 
only of  a national nature and susceptible to local systemic shocks, maintaining the great 
connection between banks and States, as well as affection of  the deposit guarantee parity 
and depositor’s confidence, the creation of  a European Deposit Insurance Scheme has 
become urgent as it promotes strong and harmonised protection for all depositors 
located in the participating Member States of  the European Banking Union, ensuring 
that the depositor’s degree of  confidence is not linked to the geographic location, that 
is, all depositors in the Banking Union must enjoy the same protection regardless of  
the country where they are located.57
It should be noted that the deposit guarantee is not an innovation implemented 
by the future European Deposit Insurance Scheme, but a component implemented 
by the existing national systems and the European Directive that sought to harmonise 
national Deposit Guarantee Schemes: Directive 2014/49/EU of  16 April, which is the 
successor to Directive 94/19/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council and 
Directive 2009/14/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council. The recent 
Directive of  2014, compared to the previous ones, extended the harmonised level 
of  deposit coverage (EUR 100 000), reduced the repayment periods (seven working 
days) and determined transitional rules for the Member States that had higher amounts 
[as, for example, Article 19 (1) of  Directive 2014/49/EU]. Note that, observing 
Directive 2014/49/EU, the Deposit Guarantee Schemes have a fundamental role 
in the banking sphere, assuming two functions: (i) a preventive function in order to 
avoid the insolvency of  credit institutions, since they mitigate the risk of  flight massive 
deposits, i.e., it reduces the situation of  “deposit run”; and; (ii) a guarantee function 
for the repayment of  deposits up to a concrete amount in situations of  insolvency of  
credit institutions.58
If  the Single Supervisory Mechanism safeguards fully homogeneous supervision 
for credit institutions across the Euro area and the Single Resolution Mechanism 
ensures that a particular institution at risk of  insolvency, is resolved through a single 
resolution procedure for all credit institutions located in the Eurozone in a situation of  
insolvency, a procedure that includes a decent protection of  taxpayers in general and an 
equal treatment of  all credit institutions and creditors that are called upon to support 
bank losses regardless of  the place of  establishment, why has the European Deposit 
Insurance Scheme, an essential mechanism for applying the same rules on deposit 
guarantees in the Member States participating in the Single Supervisory Mechanism, 
not yet been adopted? Why continue with a supervisory and resolution mechanism at 
a European level and maintain deposit guarantee at a national level, if  the third pillar 
of  the European Banking Union is necessary to break the link between bank debts and 
sovereign debts and to strengthen taxpayer protection? We cannot understand why the 
implementation of  the European Deposit Insurance Scheme has been delayed.
56 See Directive 2014/49/EU of  the European Parliament and of  the Council, of  16 April.
57 See Cristina Casalinho, “União Bancária: Avanços recentes e futuros desenvolvimentos”, 7.
58 See Fernando Zunzunegui, “Comentario a la Diretiva 2014/49/UE Relativa a los Sistemas de 
Garantía de Depósitos/Commentary on Directive 2014/49/EU on Deposit Guarantee Schemes”, 
Revista General de Derecho Europeo, No. 38 (January 2016): 173 – 189,  https://www.researchgate.
net/publication/305142443_Comentario_a_la_Directiva_201449UE_relativa_a_los_sistemas_de_
garantia_de_depositos_Commentary_on_Directive_201449EU_on_deposit_guarantee_schemes.
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The establishment of  the European Deposit Insurance Scheme must respect 
the principle of  subsidiarity [Article 5(3) of  the Treaty on European Union] and the 
principle of  proportionality [Article 5(4) of  the Treaty on European Union]. On the 
first principle, this European mechanism should only intervene if  strictly necessary, 
that is, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme will only intervene when Member 
States are unable to safeguard the adequate protection of  depositors, since the 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme will only act if  the resources of  the national 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes are exhausted. For the second principle, the action of  the 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme should not exceed what is strictly necessary to 
achieve the objectives of  the Treaties.59
The legal regime of  the future European Deposit Insurance Scheme is set out 
in the Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council, 
of  24 November 2015, amending the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation in 
order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme. According to the Proposal 
for Regulation, the implementation of  the European Deposit Insurance Scheme will 
be gradual until the national funds are merged into the European mechanism. this 
implementation comprises of  three phases: (i) a reinsurance scheme; (ii) a co-insurance 
scheme; and (iii) a full insurance scheme. In the reinsurance scheme (Article 41-A 
and the following Articles of  the Proposal for a Regulation), with three-year duration 
(2017, 2018 and 2019), the European Deposit Insurance Scheme provides limited 
funding and covers a limited part of  the loss of  a particular participating Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme involved in a situation of  repayment or contribution to a particular 
resolution, whereas in a primitive phase of  reinsurance, deposit coverage is restricted 
to resolution procedures directed by the Single Resolution Board, as national resolution 
procedures will be included in the co-insurance and full insurance scheme. In the co-
insurance scheme (Articles 41-D and following of  the Proposal for a Regulation), with 
a duration of  four years (2020 to 2023), the participating Deposit Guarantee Scheme 
may request both financing and loss cover from the Deposit Insurance Fund if  they 
are faced with a repayment situation or in a situation that they are asked to contribute 
to a resolution. The distinction between this and the first phase of  the implementation 
of  the European Deposit Insurance Scheme is linked to the fact that the funding made 
available and the coverage of  losses in the first phase is made from the “first euro”, 
as the part for which the European Deposit Insurance Scheme takes responsibility 
and will gradually increase during the coinsurance scheme. The last phase, the full 
insurance scheme (Articles 41-H and following of  the Proposal for a Regulation), the 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes will be fully insured by the European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme, providing absolute financing in view of  the need for liquidity and covering all 
losses arising from a case of  repayment or a request for contribution to a resolution, 
that is, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme at this stage will cover 100%, while 
the first phase covers only 20% of  the excess losses and the second phase up to 80% 
of  the losses. The European Deposit Insurance in the last phase will insure deposits 
up to EUR 100 000. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the predetermined years 
for the occurrence of  the first phase have already been exceeded, which means that to 
implement the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, the predetermined period for the 
59 See Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council, amending Regulation 
(EU) No. 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, of  24 November 2015, 
COM (2015) 586 final, accessed March 29, 2019, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
PT/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015PC0586&from=EN.
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three phases will have to be updated.
The European Deposit Insurance Scheme will be administered by the Single 
Resolution Board and managed by this together with the Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
(or by the entities appointed by the Deposit Guarantee Schemes) and will have at its 
disposal a Deposit Insurance Fund, owned by the Single Resolution Board, financed 
by contributions (ex-ante and ex-post) of  the credit institutions connected with the 
participating Deposit Guarantee Schemes that the Single Resolution Board may use to 
provide financing and cover losses of  the participating Deposit Guarantee Schemes in 
the three phases already mentioned.60
It is important to highlight that the European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
comprises two procedures differentiated by the time at which they occur: a specific 
procedure for obtaining funding and a procedure subsequent to granting funding.
In the procedure for obtaining financing, if  the national Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
is aware of  the typical circumstances of  a repayment case, it must immediately inform 
the Single Resolution Board if  it wants coverage by the European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme (Article 41-K of  the Proposal for a Regulation), having to subsequently notify 
and present relevant information to the Single Resolution Board (such as, for example, 
information about the amount of  deposits covered by a particular credit institution) 
for the second to analyze whether the conditions for granting financing and loss cover 
have been observed and whether they are in accordance with the provisions for the 
three phases (Article 41-L of  the Proposal for Regulation). Having said that, the Single 
Resolution Board must decide within 24 hours whether the conditions imposed for 
the coverage of  the European Deposit Insurance Scheme have been met and, if  these 
conditions have been met, determine the financing conditions [Article 41-M(1) of  the 
Proposal for a Regulation].61
The procedure subsequent to granting funding with the determination, by the 
Single Resolution Board, of  excess losses (in the case of  the reinsurance scheme) or 
losses (in the case of  the co-insurance scheme or the full insurance scheme) of  the 
participating Deposit Guarantee Schemes, monitoring the use of  the financing granted 
for the purpose in question, and the participating Deposit Guarantee must reimburse 
the financing granted by the Single Resolution Board [Articles 41-N, 41-O (1), 41-P 
and 41-Q of  the Proposal for Regulation]. After reimbursement, the Single Resolution 
Board should analyse the development of  losses before defining the total loss, as 
well as monitor reimbursement, and the participating Deposit Guarantee Scheme is 
responsible for communicating all relevant information and maximising the insolvency 
estate (Articles 41-O and 41-Q of  the Proposal for Regulation). The participating 
Deposit Guarantee Scheme will have to reimburse the Single Resolution Board for the 
funding it has been granted, deducting the amount of  any coverage of  excess losses, in 
the case of  coverage in the reinsurance scheme, or of  any loss coverage, in the case of  
coverage in the co-insurance scheme and in the full insurance scheme (Articles 41-A, 
41-D , 41-H, 41-N and 41-O of  the Proposal for a Regulation).62
60 See “Understanding Bank Recovery and Resolution in the EU: A Guidebook to the BRRD” of  the World 
Bank Group, of  April 2017, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/100781485375368909/
pdf/112266-REVISED-PUBLIC-0317-FinSAC-BRRD-Guidebook.pdf.
61 See Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council, amending 
Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, of  
24 November 2015, COM (2015) 586 final,  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/PT/TXT/
PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015PC0586&from=EN.
62 See Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council, amending Regulation 
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However, Germany’s oppression of  the European Deposit Insurance Scheme 
no longer exists, as the third pillar of  the Banking Union significantly strengthens the 
resilience of  the national Deposit Guarantee Schemes and creates the independence 
of  EU from the USA and China. But how? By completing the Banking Union. 
The Banking Union is undeniable, and it alone can help the EU in the face of  a 
new financial crisis. But Germany only agrees to complete the Banking Union after 
having met a series of  preconditions, preconditions laid down in a non-paper written 
by the German Government.63
Furthermore, a new draft report on Banking Union, supported by the 
Commission and the European Central Bank, has been drawn up by Portuguese MEP 
Pedro Marques, who has already been approved by the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs, but is awaiting the final vote in plenary in March. This proposal 
demonstrates the urgency of  implementing deposit guarantees at a European level, 
since the third pillar of  the Banking Union will be essential for the protect depositors 
against banking disruptions and to ensure confidence among depositors and investors 
across the Banking Union and in the reliability of  this European project.64
5. Final remarks
Having made some comments on the functioning of  the future European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme, we conclude that without the third pillar of  the European 
Banking Union, credit institutions remain “European in life, but national in death”, 
since banking supervision and resolution are at a European level, while the last pillar, 
which is also responsible for preserving financial stability, remains national in nature. 
Although the Member States of  the Euro area are on the right track in overcoming 
the chaotic effects of  the 2007/2008 financial crisis and the sovereign debt crises, 
with increasing economic development, this does not mean that they are exempt 
from being targets of  a new financial crisis and perhaps of  a sovereign crisis, and the 
implementation of  the European Deposit Insurance Scheme is unavoidable so that 
the link between banks and states can be completely set aside and, to some extent, 
the stability of  the financial system is preserved.
Without Germany’s resistance to the completion of  the Banking Union and 
with the emergence of  the new draft report, it is time to implement the European 
Deposit Insurance Scheme before a new financial crisis arises that could disrupt the 
smooth functioning and stability of  the European financial system. Only with the 
implementation of  the third pillar of  the Banking Union it will be complete, with 
depositors duly protected, as well as with the completion of  this European project 
will there be the deepening of  Economic and Monetary Union? We hope that the 
conclusion of  the Banking Union will be completed for a considerable time, or at 
least before the eruption of  the financial and economic crisis such as happened in 
2007/2008.
(EU) No. 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, of  24 November 2015, 
COM (2015) 586 final, accessed March 29, 2019, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/
PT/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015PC0586&from=EN.
63 See Position paper on the goals of  the banking union, of  5 November 2019, accessed January 12, 
2020, available at http://prod-upp-image-read.ft.com/b750c7e4-ffba-11e9-b7bc-f3fa4e77dd47.
64 Draft Report on Banking Union – annual report 2019 of  the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs, of  15 November 2019, accessed February 9, 2020, available at http://www.europarl.europa.
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2020 is the year in which the timeline is defined by the measures to be implemented 
in the future and the year in which the European Deposit Insurance Scheme, which 
is responsible for supplementing national Deposit Guarantee Schemes, is no longer 
a ghost that continues to frighten European financial stability.
